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Apostoledes v. State: MURDER RETRIAL NOT BARRED BY
DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHERE
FIRST TRIAL RESULTED IN
CONSPIRACY ACQUITTAL AND
JURY DEADLOCK.
In Apostoledes v. State, 593 A.2d
1117 (Md. 1991), the Court of Appeals of Maryland allowed the retrial
of a defendant charged with murder
committed by a principal in the second
degree, even though her previous trial
had resulted in an acquittal as to the
conspiracy charge and a jury deadlock
as to the second degree murder charge.
The defendant, Marie Apostoledes,
asserted that her prior acquittal barred
a retrial for reasons based upon established double jeopardy grounds and
the recent United States Supreme Court
holding of Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.
Ct. 2084 (1990).
While at his home in 1988, Stephen
Apostoledes received three gunshot
wounds to the head that resulted in his
death. The victim's wife, Ms.
Apostoledes, and her son, John Lacey,
were also present in the home at the
time of the shooting. Following the
shooting, both Ms. Apostoledes and
her son were charged in connection
with the murder. John Lacey pled
guilty to second degree murder. The
State brought a four count indictment
against Ms. Apostoledes, charging
her with: (1) first degree murder including the lesser included offenses of
second degree murder and manslaughter, (2) conspiracy to commit murder,
(3) unlawful use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony, and (4) accessory after the fact to murder.
At trial, the State presented evidence that after the shooting, Ms.
Apostoledes waited approximately one
hour before calling 911, thereby allowing her husband to bleed to death.
The State also produced two key witnesses, the first of whom testified that
he heard pinging sounds shortly after
leaving the house and the room in
which both Ms. Apostoledes and the
victim were located. The State's second witness, Lacey's girlfriend, testi-

fied that she had confronted Ms.
Apostoledes regarding her involvementintheshooting. Ms. Apostoledes
neither denied nor commented on the
accusation. Lacey's girlfriend also
testified that Ms. Apostoledes had
stated that she did not love her husband and wished he were dead. At the
close of all evidence, the judge acquitted Ms. Apostoledes on the charges of
conspiracy and accessory after the
fact. The jury could not reach a
verdict on the two remaining counts of
murder and unlawful handgun use.
The court, therefore, granted a mistrial.
The State subsequently moved to
retry Ms. Apostoledes. Before the
second trial, Ms. Apostoledes moved
to dismiss the indictment for second
degree murder arguing that a retrial
would be violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Apostoledes, 593 A.2d at 1120. The
circuit court denied her motion to
dismiss and stayed proceedings until
review by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland . After the court of
special appeals affirmed the circuit
court's decision, the court of appeals
granted certiorari.
In the course of her appeal, Ms.
Apostoledes contended that a second
trial was barred by three forms of
double jeopardy: former jeopardy/
acquittal, collateral estoppel, and the
" same conduct" test derived from the
recent United States Supreme Court
decision of Grady v. Corbin.
Apostoledes, 593 A.2d at 1120, 1123.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by first examining Ms.
Apostoledes's argument that former
jeopardy/acquittal barred retrial. The
court agreed that under former jeopardy/acquittal, Ms. Apostoledes could
not be retried if the two charges were
found to be the same offense. However, the court determined that conspiracy and murder by a principal in
the second degree were not the same
offenses. The court stated, " [t]he gist
of a conspiracy is an agreement be-

tween two persons to commit a crime. "
[d. at 1120.
The court emphasized that for the
crime of murder committed by a principal in the second degree, there need
not be proof of an agreement as in the
case of a conspiracy. Rather, the court
held that there must be proof that the
defendant "was present and aided,
counseled, commanded, or encouraged the commission of the murder. "
[d. Because Ms. Apostoledes could
have aided Lacey in the murder without any agreement, the court concluded that" neither an acquittal nor a
conviction of a conspiracy is a bar to
a prosecution for the commission of
that crime or for aiding or abetting
another to commit it." [d. at 1121
(quoting Gi/pin v. State, 121 A. 354,
356 (Md. 1923».
The court further found that the
retrial was not barred for collateral
estoppel reasons resulting from
Apostoledes's acquittal on the conspiracy charge. For collateral estoppel to apply, the court reasoned that
the two criminal charges must have
had a common, necessary factual component. 593 A.2d at 1121 (relying on
Ashv. Swenson, 397U.S. 436(1970».
The court noted that collateral estoppel focuses on what the factfinder did
find or must have found. 593 A.2d at
1121 (citing Ferrellv. State, 567 A.2d
937, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3301
(1990».
The court reviewed the comments
of the trial judge who emphasized that
an individual can be acquitted for
conspiracy but still found guilty of
murder in the second degree by aiding
and abetting. The court agreed that
the acquittal on the conspiracy count
was not based on the State's failure to
prove a fact that was an essential
element of murder and thus, collateral
estoppel did not apply. 593 A.2d at
1122.
The court of appeals also reviewed
the most recent double jeopardy defense by interpreting Grady v. Corbin.
593 A.2d at 1123-24. Under the
"same conduct" test in Grady,
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Apostoledes argued that the State would
be precluded from a retrial because to
do so would force the State to prove
conduct for which she was previously
tried. [d. at 1123. However, the court
of appeals stated, " [n]owhere in its
opinion did the Grady Court suggest
that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple trials when one
or more counts are left unresolved
following an initial trial due to jury
deadlock, the grant of a new trial, or
reversal on appeal." [d. at 1123. The
court asserted, rather, that the holding
in Grady applied to cases in which the
State failed to bring and join for trial
all charges arising from a single episode in a single proceeding. By initially bringing all criminal charges
against Ms. Apostoledes in a single
proceeding, the State conformed exactly to Grady's new double jeopardy
" same conduct" test, thereby avoiding the double jeopardy problems at
issue in Grady. [d.
Judge McAuliffe concurred in the
ruling with the exception of the
majority's interpretation of double
jeopardy in Grady. He opined that the
Supreme Court did not limit Grady to
successive prosecutions only, but may
have intended it to apply to multiple
punishments as well. Finding the
Blockberger "same offense" test a
rather sterile approach, McAuliffe
stated, "[t]he Grady modification
utilizes a case-oriented approach, adding flesh to the bare bones of each
essential element the conduct used to
prove that element, and then comparing the list of elements so defined."
[d. at 1124 (citing Blockberger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
He concluded, though, that even if
Grady did apply to multiple punishments, the result in this case would not
have changed because conspiracy and
murder are not the same offense. 593
A.2d at 1126.
In its review of double jeopardy
challenges, the court ruled that former
jeopardy /acquittal, collateral estoppel,
and the recent Grady" same conduct"
test did not preclude the State from
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retrying the case for second degree
murder despite a prior conspiracy acquittal. This decision is significant as
it gives the State the opportunity for a
retrial in cases of acquittal or jury
deadlock and provides insight into
how Grady should be interpreted.
- Karl Phillips
Chisom v. Roemer: JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS COVERED WITIllN
MEANING OF "REPRESENTATIVES" IN VOTERS' RIGHTS
ACT.
The Supreme Court of the United
States settled a statutory interpretation
conflict among federal courts of appeals in deciding Chisom v. Roemer,
111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). In Chisom,
the Supreme Court held that the use of
the term" representatives" in the Voters' Rights Act of 1965, as amended in
1982, covers judicial elections as well
as legislative elections. This holding
overturned the interpretation of Section 2 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The petitioners in Chisom represented a class of approximately 135,000
African-American registered voters in
Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The petitioners brought their suit against various state elected officials challenging
the electoral process of judges to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana
consists of seven members. Two are
elected from one multi-member supreme court district. The remaining
five members are elected in singlemember supreme court districts. The
one multi-member district consists of
four parishes, one of which is the
Orleans Parish. In the Orleans Parish
more than one-half of the registered
voters are African-American, whereas
three-fourths of the registered voters
in the other three parishes are white.
The petitioners alleged that the
Louisiana method of electing judges
impermissibly diluted the voting
strength of African-Americans in violationofSection2 of the Voters Rights

Act of 1965 by broadening the populace of voters, thus frustrating efforts
by African-Americans to elect an African-American judge. [d. The United
States District Court for the District of
Louisiana dismissed the petitioners'
claim holding that judges are not" representatives," and thus judicial elections are not covered under Section 2
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d. at 2359.
On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case finding that the term "representatives"
within the Voters' Rights Act included
anyone elected by a popular election
from a field of candidates. The court
thus held that judges were included
within the meaning of " representatives." [d. On remand the district
court concluded that insufficient evidence existed to establish a violation
of Section 2 of the Voters' Rights Act
and the petitioners appealed once again
to the court of appeals. [d. at 2360.
Following the en banc decision in a
similar case, the court of appeals remanded Chisom, and the petitioners
appealed. [d. at 2361.
While the petitioners' appeal was
pending, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decided League o/United
Latin-American Citizens Council v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (1990) (hereinafter "LULAC"), a case similar to
Chisom involving the interpretation
of "representative" within Section 2
of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965.
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. 2360. TheLULAC
court reasoned that, because public
opinion is irrelevant in the role of the
judiciary, judges do not serve in a
representative capacity and are not
included within the meaning of " representative" in interpreting Section 2
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari arid consolidated LULA C and
Chisom for determining the test to be
applied in deciding whether a violation of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965
exists in judicial and other elections.
[d. at 2362.
The Court began its analysis by
setting out the text of Section 2 of the

